



# Public Policy:

*Current Thinking on Critical Issues*

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Carmen M.  
**Reinhart**

Jack A.  
**Meyer**

Daniel H.  
**Levine**

Jacques S.  
**Gansler**

I. M. "Mac"  
**Destler**  
and Ivo H.  
**Daalder**

Catherine M.  
**Kelleher**

**Advice to the  
*New Administration***

Maryland School of Public Policy

UNIVERSITY OF  
MARYLAND

## From the Dean:

This is an exciting time to be part of a school of public policy. As I write these words, the campaign for the presidency of the United States is in full swing. We do not yet know if Sen. John McCain or Sen. Barack Obama will prevail in this contest, but one thing is absolutely certain: Whichever candidate wins will confront an array of threats and challenges as serious as any faced by an American president. These include a weakened economy and the failure of venerable financial institutions; a federal budget deficit projected to exceed a half-trillion dollars; escalating health care costs that consume an ever-increasing fraction of our national income; wars in Iraq and Afghanistan with no end in sight; the emergence of a confident China and an assertive Russia at a time when international esteem for the United States and deference to its leadership are at the lowest point since the second world war; and the threat of global climate change and the challenge of weaning not just the United States but the world economy from a reliance on fossil fuels.

The Maryland School of Public Policy is well-positioned to help the new administration address these difficult issues. As illustrated by the brief articles in this journal, our faculty includes experts on both domestic and foreign policy, and in the formulation as well as implementation of policy. All are respected policy scholars; many have held senior positions in the U.S. government. This faculty delivers a broad core curriculum—micro- and macroeconomics, statistics, political institutions, ethics, management and leadership, and finance—that gives students the knowledge and skills needed to succeed in a wide range of endeavors, as well as specialized courses in environmental policy, security policy, international economic policy, international development, budgeting and various aspects of social policy. Nearly half of our graduates go to work in the federal government, with most of the remainder choosing state and local government as well as think tanks, nonprofits and other nongovernmental and international organizations dedicated to public service and the solution of pressing policy problems.

Steve Fetter  
*Dean, Maryland School of Public Policy*

**T**he School of Public Policy at the University of Maryland provides graduate studies in a comprehensive range of domestic and international policy areas. Situated near the nation's capital, the school affords access for students, faculty and scholars to the broad spectrum of government agencies and non-government organizations that formulate and implement policies affecting the economy, the environment, families and international relations.

We are the only policy school in the Washington, D.C., area that is embedded in a major research university, allowing students to benefit from interactions with top-ranked graduate programs in business, criminology, engineering, education and government and politics.

**In a recent study, the Maryland School of Public Policy ranked eighth in the nation in faculty scholarly productivity.**

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# Advice to the Next Secretary of the Treasury

by Carmen M. Reinhart

The range of performance and perception of the three people who have been secretary of the treasury in the past eight years should strike fear in those contemplating filling those shoes in the next administration. The Bush presidency began with Paul O'Neill at the helm of the treasury, a man filled with good intentions but neither trusted by financial market participants nor, apparently, the White House.

O'Neill was followed by John Snow, who was relegated to advancing the cause of programs designed elsewhere in the administration. Considerable authority to shape and implement policy has only lately fallen to Henry M. Paulson Jr., likely because his market expertise has been needed at a time of considerable financial stress.

Thus, the most important single piece of advice for anyone who might be tapped to be the next secretary of the treasury is simple: Do not take the job unless the authority and influence associated with having the trust of the president comes with it. Under those conditions, it can be an important, indeed critical, assignment at a time of great national need.

The immediate task will be tackling the work undone in responding to the ongoing financial crisis. This will require a short-term fix and a long-term focus. As a nation, we built too many houses. Economic growth has shifted down as we cope with that excess, which involves a sharp reduction in the construction of new homes

and price declines of those already built. This adjustment has elevated defaults on home mortgages and has been associated with sizable declines in the prices of securities backed by mortgages.

These capital losses have blown gaping holes into the balance sheets of firms that are the center of our financial trading system. Until those firms attract more capital to fill those holes, economy-wide spending will be crimped by the unavailability of credit and poor market functioning.

The process of getting that capital from elsewhere in the private sector has flagged of late. That is why the Department of the Treasury had to step in to rescue the mortgage lending giants Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. But Fannie and Freddie may only be the first in line to get assistance. The first order of business for the new secretary may well be to provide federal funds to other financial firms in distress.

My research suggests that the longer that infusion is delayed, the higher ultimately will be the resolution cost. (I address this issue in my paper with Kenneth Rogoff, "Is the 2007 U.S. Subprime Crisis So Different? An International Historical Comparison" *American Economic Review*, Vol. 98 No. 2, May 2008.) In work with my co-author, Ken Rogoff of Harvard University, I documented 18 episodes of financial crisis in industrial economies over the past 30 years.

Declines in assets, including those of both houses and equities that the

United States has experienced over the past year, are common markers of the onset of banking crises. In the worst five banking crises in industrial countries over the past 30 years, the value of houses fell about 25 percent on average from their peak. The cautionary lesson for today's situation in the United States is that the decline in output after a banking crisis is both large and protracted. The average drop in (real per capita) output growth is over 2 percent, and it typically takes two years to return to trend. For the five most catastrophic cases, the drop in annual output growth from peak to trough is over 5 percent, and growth remained well below pre-crisis trend even after three years.

With many urgent public needs unmet, directing resources to former "masters of the universe" on Wall Street would seem particularly unpalatable. But a time may come, as it did for Paulson with regard to the government-sponsored enterprises, to submerge those value judgments in favor of keeping markets running and not impeding the flow of credit any more than it is already. The next secretary will have to explain to his or her colleagues in the Cabinet and on Capitol Hill that the scope for ambitious spending increases and tax reductions may be limited by the need to provide funds to financial institutions currently lacking capital.

The cost of such aid will only be tolerated if significant financial reforms accompany it to help prevent a repeat of this latest market meltdown. Our financial regulation



is woefully inadequate, with multiple regulators who generally take narrow, legalistic views of their roles. This leads to all manner of regulatory arbitrage, in which businesses act to take advantage of the uneven parts of the playing field. We should not forget, for instance, that the financial engineering that created the mortgage-related securities that now have proven so troublesome existed in part because of the special status given highly rated securities in banking regulation. There should be fewer regulators, simpler corporate structures, more consolidation of balance sheets and an increased reliance on capital as the cushion to balance-sheet difficulties.

Significant work remains undone in rationalizing government regulation as well.

First, and equally pressing, is the tax system. As the President's

Advisory Panel on Tax Reform reported back in 2005, "Our tax code is rewritten so often that it should be drafted in pencil." Another short-term fiscal fix—one that has the effect of raising marginal tax rates—goes in the wrong direction. Effort would be better spent figuring out which of the reforms on the advisory panel's menu would be the most acceptable.

Second, contingent liabilities of the government continue to pile up, including those related to Social Security and Medicare. That accumulation will only get worse as the population ages. Hard work has to get started on bringing the needs and resources available for those programs into better balance.

Third, considerable thought needs to be directed toward protecting the national economy in an uncertain world. We should not go backward in the decade-long efforts

to strengthen the international trading system. Voices arguing for protectionism have already been heard, even though the unemployment rate has only just risen above 6 percent. If the economy weakens and labor market slack builds, those voices will be louder and more insistent. The secretary will have to be a voice of reason, perhaps a lonely one, reminding everyone that open markets are the surest means of bettering our lot. **P**



**Carmen M. Reinhart** is professor of economics in the School of Public Policy and the university's Department of Economics. She is a research associate at the National Bureau of Economic Research and a research fellow at the Centre for Economic Policy Research. Reinhart served as chief economist and vice president at Bear Stearns and as deputy director at the research department of the International Monetary Fund. Her expertise includes macroeconomics, international capital

flows, capital controls, inflation and commodity prices, banking and sovereign debt crises, currency crashes and contagion. Her work is widely published in leading scholarly journals, including the *American Economic Review* and the *Journal of Political Economy*. She is frequently featured in the financial press worldwide. Reinhart is writing (with Kenneth S. Rogoff) a book on the history of financial crises, *This Time is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly*.

# Health Reform in 2009

## Assessing the Presidential Candidates' Plans

by Jack A. Meyer

**T**he U.S. health care system is facing serious problems. The sharply rising cost of health insurance is holding down wages and adversely affecting many employers. There is mounting evidence of widespread inappropriate medical care, waste and inefficiency, and threats to patient safety. More than 45 million Americans lack health insurance and millions more are underinsured.

This year's presidential race offers a choice between competing visions for health reform. Republican U.S. Sen. John McCain would offer all Americans new fixed-dollar tax credits to help pay for health insurance. These credits would substitute for current tax law that allows employees to exclude the full value of their employers' contributions to health coverage from their federal and state taxable income. McCain would also allow people to "shop" nationally for the most affordable health insurance, not just in their own state, and to join "association health plans" that would provide the same exemption from state insurance mandates as that enjoyed by larger, self-insured employer-sponsored health plans.

Democratic U.S. Sen. Barack Obama's health-care reform plan would bring more lower-income Americans into Medicaid and the State Children's Health Insurance Program (SCHIP) and automatically enroll adults and children eligible for but not participating in these programs. The Obama plan would give people without access to employer coverage two options: They could get a choice of health plans through a "national insurance

exchange" or enroll in a new publicly sponsored health plan. Obama would also require all parents to arrange for health insurance for their children. Employers must either offer health coverage or pay an assessment to help fund the plan.

Both plans promise three things: a greater effort to improve care for those with chronic illness, improved health information technology and a greater emphasis on prevention and wellness. The McCain and Obama plans also face serious challenges.

### Improving McCain's plan

The main challenge facing McCain's plan is that it does not include policy reforms that, in the judgment of most observers, would substantially lower the number of uninsured. A majority of the uninsured have low incomes, and most of this group cannot afford private coverage without a subsidy. Many work for small firms that do not offer health insurance.

The McCain plan offers tax credits of \$5,000 for families and \$2,500 for individuals. But these tax subsidies are well below the actual cost of coverage—over \$12,000 a year for a family and at least \$4,400 a year for an individual. A family with an income of \$30,000 would have to shoulder a cost burden of at least \$7,000, or almost a fourth of its pre-tax income, in order to buy the typical family health plan. Moreover, employers would have a strong incentive to stop offering health coverage, leaving many older workers and those with health conditions at the mercy of the individual market, where premiums may vary by as much as 10-1. McCain's plan would


partially address this by devoting new funding to state high-risk pools and through the national shopping options described above. But these steps would be insufficient to assure affordability.

McCain could improve his plan by making the tax credits more generous for lower-income households. Another positive step would be to allow adults living in poverty—unlikely candidates for tax credits and the private insurance market—to enroll in Medicaid regardless of whether they have dependent children. Because Medicaid excludes poor adults unless they are pregnant, disabled, elderly or caring for dependent children, more than half of all uninsured are low-income adults who fall outside these categories.

### Improving Obama's Plan

The main challenge facing the Obama plan involves the financing. The Obama campaign contends its plan would yield savings of about \$2,500 per person, and that this would finance the full cost of its plan. Savings of this magnitude represent a huge reduction in the cost of health care while many of the cost-saving policies advocated in the plan, such as those related to quality improvement, care and disease management for chronic illness, new health information technology and medical malpractice reform, may take years to generate savings, and the magnitude of such savings is difficult to estimate. While all of these goals are worthy, it is not clear that the Congressional Budget Office would "score savings" for these initiatives.

Obama could address this prob-



lem by developing a secure and sustainable financing source for his plan. This might involve making the employer contribution for companies choosing not to offer health coverage large enough to provide most of the funding. His plan merely calls for a “meaningful” contribution. An alternative is to keep this contribution more modest but use another revenue source to make up the difference. Tax increases are politically painful, and investments in an electronic system, prevention and care management will eventually lead to some savings. But the Obama plan may have to be rebalanced to assure that in the early years outlays are supported by revenue sources.

### Forging a Compromise?

Here is how a compromise might work. Congress could prepare a sensible plan to reauthorize the State Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP) for 10 years and pass it in early 2009. Neither presidential candidate would want his first act in office to be the veto of such a bill.

Second, Congress could work with the new president to develop a

plan that combines making all poor adults eligible for Medicaid regardless of their family status with offering tax credits for lower-income people in the near-poor range. Compromise: Republicans must agree to new public coverage limited to the poor while Democrats must agree to tax incentives to boost private market coverage.


Third, following the lead of Massachusetts, Congress could provide seed money and technical assistance for states to set up “insurance exchanges” where people who lack access to either government programs or employer-based coverage could obtain health coverage with pre-tax dollars via flexible spending accounts. This approach uses Obama’s idea of exchanges but places them at the state level with room for state experimentation, and drops the idea of a public plan—more in line with Republican thinking.

Fourth, Obama’s idea of requiring all parents to cover their children is included, but the requirement would not take effect for a few years, allowing the new subsidies to be ramped up first.

A final compromise could involve a ceiling on the tax exclusion of employer contributions at a level approximating average premiums—Republicans get a limited version of their preferred tax reform, Democrats maintain a level of protection of employer-based coverage. Both sides get some money to help pay for the cost of the new subsidies.

Both parties could agree that the federal government should devote substantial new resources to a strong national campaign on smoking cessation as well as a parallel effort to address obesity, chronic disease management and improved health information technology. We will also need new institutional arrangements and solid research methods to evaluate advanced medical technology.

Presidents from both parties have proposed “grand designs” with many moving parts for about 60 years, all without success in the legislative arena. States like Minnesota and Massachusetts have achieved much progress through step-by-step approaches with bipartisan support. It may be time for federal policy makers to do likewise. **P**



*Jack A. Meyer* teaches health policy in the School of Public Policy and the university’s School of Public Health. He is a principal with Health Management Associates in the Washington, D.C., office, conducting health care research, policy analysis and strategic planning for clients. He works with grant-making foundations, health industry leaders, and state and federal agencies. Meyer is the founder and president of the Economic and Social Research Institute, a nonprofit research organization. His

research areas include evaluation of new models to reduce the number of uninsured nationwide; analysis of the ingredients of hospital quality and patient safety; research on the cost to states of mental illness; assessment of states’ programs to support employer-sponsored health coverage for low-income workers; and review of promising models for improving access to health services for vulnerable populations.

# Back to the Future for the New Secretary of State

by Catherine M. Kelleher

*A School of Public Policy professor has written a hypothetical memo to the next secretary of state.*

**From:** Catherine M. Kelleher  
**To:** The secretary of state designate  
**Re:** Your first year in office—back to the future

As you contemplate your role as secretary of state, you will face among the most difficult tasks in the new administration. You have little to build on from the last eight years. The prestige and perceived power of the United States have never had lower ratings in living memory. Your biggest challenge must be to restore the standing of the past, to retrieve for the United States the status and the admiration—and even the affection—that it has so richly enjoyed and exploited in the past. This is all the more urgent given the tightening constraints on American economic resources, the overstretched military establishment and the deepening domestic fatigue with overseas wars and interventions.

What follows are five basic prescriptions for action, beyond the president's substantive priorities, that will allow you to reemphasize America's postwar tradition of international engagement, democratic norms and serious diplomacy. Most will require far more time to become enduring policy frameworks. All will define the benchmarks, barring external catastrophe, for measurable success over the next four years.

## Prescription #1

**Restore diplomacy as the administration's international instrument of first resort**

Starkly put, the Bush diplomatic style has been unilateralist, confrontational and prone to compromise only in the face of deep disappointment or duress. The reasons for this can be debated; the fears and the tendency to act precipitously engendered by the shock of the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, are only one.

But whether valid or not, this is not about the past. You now need to frame the future, to demonstrate credibly that this will not be your style. As in the best of the postwar American tradition, your goals will be to speak softly but clearly first and to use force as a last resort, to negotiate openly and frequently, to promote global standards of acceptable international behavior for the U.S. as for others, and to seek the protection of human rights and the furtherance of the rule of law.

The easiest arena for instant credibility will not be a rapid round of travel but an enthusiastic embrace of treaties. This is a leading indicator of your intentions for the international community. Kyoto and climate change are obvious priorities, followed by emphasis on a renewed Non-Proliferation Treaty regime with the IAEA additional protocol. You can immediately reopen treaty doors Bush closed—e.g., on the International Criminal Court or even the ever-more valuable Law of the Sea. You redo the past—e.g., initiate studies on how to turn deliberate nontreaty agreements such as

the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) into formal transparent treaties. There are scores of new treaties to be launched where the persuasive power of an engaged, open American leadership can once again be demonstrated. And the best start is your appointment of respected, expert American representatives to the major international organizations

## Prescription #2

**Return to JFK's first principles—never fear to negotiate or negotiate out of fear alone**

Your primary strategy is to identify as soon as possible areas for a clear exchange of considered opinion with an ally and adversary, even if an outcome that meets our requirements is not the expected outcome. The Bush team came to see this only belatedly in its second term, and then only in arenas where it was either confident of the result (the Indian nuclear deal) or pressured to do so by fear of failure (the North Korean 6 party talks).

Which of the critical negotiations should come first is a question of the president's priorities. But do not forget that negotiation is sometimes as much about mutual education and reestablishing bona fides as about a specific outcome. The best path to deal with an angry, more powerful Russia, for example, may well be negotiations similar to those practiced in the arms control efforts of the 1960s and 1970s—careful, regular and expert multilevel discussions on a limited set of topics defined as being of mutual interest. This would be in sharp contrast to the discontinuous American-Russian relations



in the past administration—with sporadic lurches at the highest levels, and indifferent follow-through, or miscommunication at lower levels. Turkey would seem a second prime candidate for such talks.

### Prescription #3

**Rediscover multilateralism—it can be a cheaper and more effective, if also slower, means to many desired outcomes**

Alliances have not been the Bush team's strong suit. Its initial assumption was either that American power and preeminence meant others would eventually follow our lead or that allies were too much trouble to persuade. Iraq, Afghanistan and the Georgian crisis have all taught bitter lessons about the nature of alliances. But actions, not just words, will show key allies—particularly those in Europe and in Asia—that we are serious about consultation and cooperation, and no longer fixed only on our own path.

Three lessons seem easily at hand. The first is the famous “no surprises” rule: Do not fail to communicate early and often and listen to the responses. This must be as true for the U.S. as it is for Georgia. Change is rarely welcomed as warmly among major allies as in the United States policy debate. Second, do not forget Richard Neustadt's warning: Miscommunication abounds in even the closest of relationships. Allies assume we will at least ask their opinions about change while we expect them to watch our

evolving debate and object if they don't like what they see, or even to understand why we must change our minds. Third, if we have serious realistic bonds, any intra-alliance dispute is not and cannot outweigh enduring alliance relationships. The threat in Iraq, just as was true in Vietnam, did not override the value of NATO to the United States in general, nor did it justify megaphone attack diplomacy within the Alliance or across the globe. At a minimum, the dispute should have caused significant pause for reconsideration and perhaps legitimate compromise.

### Prescription #4

**Rediscover the positives of public diplomacy and soft power**

Your task is the perennial challenge: how to both serve the president and represent the nation as a whole and for the longer term to the international community. The Bush focus was on immediate gains, not long-term investments or the building of relationships. Moreover, public diplomacy was often reactive and defensive—e.g., the Bush response bureaus set up by partisans to counter within 24 hours adverse press stories or blog and cable allegations.

You should seek to right the balance. Your touchstones should be the best representation of American values and debate, with a stress on diversity of opinion and dissent as a strength, not a weakness. You should proudly proclaim confidence in debate in the long haul and

our willingness to learn as well as to instruct. Persuasion by example has worked in the past in open exchanges of speakers and students, in cultural programs and in nonpoliticized outreach to international audiences. Failure to participate in noncanned discussions has hurt our image badly as have “loyalty” tests for visas. The results are seen abroad as proof of arrogance and ideology.

### Prescription #5

**Reengage people, technologies and research in foreign policy**

The substantive challenges you face require the best, but you will have neither more resources nor easy support from a battered electorate. You must reengage and reorganize the resources you have—a dedicated Foreign Service with fresh inputs, the new options IT and agile communication technologies give you at lower costs and the unquenchable interest of students and researchers in the foreign policy agenda. Look, too, at the political success—at home and abroad—of past models of direct citizen engagement: the Peace Corps, the state partners in the Partnership for Peace and the tsunami voyages of the medical ship *USS Hope*, for example. The costs are relatively low; the payoff in international goodwill, and even some Congressional enthusiasm, is substantial. **P**




**Catherine M. Kelleher** is a College Park Professor in the School of Public Policy and senior advisor to the Geneva Center on Security Policy. She has taught and written extensively on conventional and nuclear arms control as well as on German, Russian and European security issues. She has authored more than 60 books and articles. Her government service has spanned periods on the National Security Council, in the Department of Defense and on panels of the National Academies of Sciences. She

is the founder of Women in International Security, and has served on advisory and research boards of institutes and nongovernmental organizations in the United States and in Germany.

# A Job That Matters

## What the President's National Security Adviser Must Do

by I. M. "Mac" Destler and Ivo H. Daalder



The president's national security adviser sits at the crossroads of power. Fourteen men and one woman have held the position since John F. Kennedy and McGeorge Bundy transformed it to focus on current foreign policy business. The job works best when the national security adviser serves as an "honest broker" who connects the president with his senior officials, exposes him to a broad range of policy ideas, protects him from ill-considered decisions and offers him discrete advice. Bundy did this well. So did Brent Scowcroft, who served both Gerald Ford and George H. W. Bush

More than half of the 15, however, did their jobs in ways that created serious problems for the administrations in which they served. Henry Kissinger used the position to monopolize power on behalf of Richard Nixon, provoking bitter conflict with those, like the secretary of state, who were shut out of the action. Lyndon Johnson's Walt Rostow and Jimmy Carter's Zbigniew Brzezinski held such strong, even ideological policy views that they were not trusted by senior colleagues to play the honest broker role. When she served as national security adviser, Condoleezza Rice was unable to manage policy making effectively for George W. Bush because the vice president and the secretary of defense circumvented her with impunity. And none of Ronald Reagan's first four national security advisers measured up to the job. Only after the Iran-Contra scandal nearly destroyed his presidency did Reagan turn to professionals—Frank Carlucci, then Colin

Powell—who brought order to the Reagan advisory team, and a happy ending to his foreign policy. In turn, the processes they established contributed to more effective performance by advisers in the Bush 41 and Clinton administrations.

The formal position of "assistant to the president for national security affairs" has no statutory existence; it is the creation of presidents. It dates from 1953, when Dwight D. Eisenhower wanted a senior White House aide to manage his elaborate policy-planning process built around the National Security Council (NSC). Kennedy abolished that formal process, which he found sterile, but kept the position and charged Bundy, its occupant, with managing his daily policy business and connecting him to the broader government. Thus was born a job with enormous potential power. And because, unlike the secretaries of state and defense, its occupant is not subject to Senate confirmation (and hence to the constituencies involved in that process), the president is free to choose whoever he wants, and command the adviser's undivided loyalty.

Two other innovations enhanced the influence of Bundy and his successors. One was the recruitment of a staff of expert senior aides identified with the current president (in place of Eisenhower's much larger civil service staff). The second was the creation of the White House Situation Room, wherein copies of cable communications to and from the State Department and other agencies came directly to this staff, enhancing their capacity to oversee the government.

In subsequent years, the NSC staff has grown—from around 10 under Bundy to over 100 substantive aides today. And the communications technology has, of course, undergone a revolution. But both have remained as vital instruments of presidential foreign policy management, supporting the central role of his national security adviser.

Each president shapes the position to meet his own needs. So a Bundy who was near-ideal for Kennedy had growing difficulties with his successor, Lyndon Johnson. No doubt John McCain or Barack Obama will have his own ideas about the type of service he wants from his national security adviser, not to mention the individual he wants for the job. But to be successful, the incumbent will need to do more than meet the president's immediate needs. Rice has been found wanting because she did not insist (against her president's gut inclinations) on a serious review of the pros and cons of waging war on Iraq, and of how that country would be stabilized and governed once the war was "won." Her successor, Stephen Hadley, did press for an Iraq policy review four years later, resulting in the adoption of the "surge" strategy.

To maximize the chances that his NSC adviser will serve him effectively, the president should look for someone with a bent for policy process—for including the right people, for asking the right questions—over and above her or his commitment to specific policy outcomes. Once chosen, the assistant should quickly recruit a substantive staff (cut back

substantially from the current size) and put in place an interagency process to develop policy options for the president on the most urgent issues. As the incoming assistant does so, however, he or she would do well to consider how Brent Scowcroft, perhaps the best of the 15 national security advisers, built his credibility and his power. He was surrounded by men of great stature and capacity—James Baker, the president’s best friend, as secretary of state, Dick Cheney as defense secretary, and Colin Powell as chairman of the joint chiefs of staff. And his president, George H. W. Bush, had policy experience and a web of international relationships like few if any of his predecessors. Yet this modest, low-profile national security adviser managed to prevail.

The “Scowcroft Formula,” as we label it, had three components.

First and critical was the establishment of trust between him and Bush’s other senior advisers. From the start, Scowcroft saw this as crucial—if he didn’t have their trust, they would go independently to the president and the process would disintegrate. So he met with them regularly, in the formal, cabinet-level “Principals Committee” which he chaired and in informal settings as well, deferring to them on issues where they had clear presidential mandates, but making it clear where the president was on those and

other issues. He was scrupulous in using his daily—often hourly—access to the president to convey their views fully and faithfully. And this became known when they themselves met with Bush, individually or as a group—an access that Scowcroft encouraged. Finally, the adviser enhanced trust by focusing on his job and not intruding on those of his colleagues. Unlike Kissinger—who negotiated himself on Nixon’s primary issues—Scowcroft let Baker do the negotiating (and Cheney run the Pentagon). And he let them take the lead in public exposition of Bush’s policies.

The second element in his formula was to build cooperative policy making deep within the government. The Principals Committee was supported by a Deputies Committee that handled ongoing issues and sudden crises, taking some of the burden from their bosses and framing for them and the president those issues that the deputies could not resolve. They in turn oversaw assistant secretary-level working groups on issues ranging from arms control to the unification of Germany. They made sure analysis was brought to bear on key issues. And they were buttressed by a strong, but relatively small, NSC staff.

Finally, Scowcroft followed the primary rule for all national security advisers—get close to the president, and stay close. He was everywhere

with the president, and their relationship became so close that after both left office, they published a unique dual memoir about their experience. And by the time Bush faced his biggest challenge—Saddam Hussein’s conquest of Kuwait—Scowcroft had so established trust with the president and his peers that he was able to step out of his standard mode of cautious advocacy and take the lead in pressing for a strong, military response.

National security advisers have one tough job. They must give priority to process and advise the president substantively. They must respond to the president but also build trust and process regularity across the administration. But no individual, save the president, will be more important to the success or failure of the next administration’s foreign policy than the next assistant to the president for national security affairs. **P**

This essay is based on Daalder and Destler’s book, *In The Shadow of the Oval Office: From JFK to Bush II: The Presidents’ National Security Advisers*, to be published in 2009.



*I.M. “Mac” Destler* is the Saul I. Stern Professor and director of the School of Public Policy’s program on international security and economic policy. He is a Fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics, publisher of Destler’s prize-winning *American Trade Politics* (fourth edition, 2005). His other books include *Our Own Worst Enemy: The Unmaking of American Foreign Policy* (with Leslie Gelb and Anthony Lake).



*Ivo H. Daalder* is a College Park Professor in the School of Public Policy and a senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution. He served on President Clinton’s National Security Council staff in 1995–96. He has published widely, including (with James M. Lindsay) the award-winning *America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy*, and *Getting to Dayton: The Making of America’s Bosnia Policy*.

# Addressing 21st Century Security

by Jacques S. Gansler

**T**he perpetrator of the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, is still pursuing al-Qaeda objectives; the U.S. and NATO are fighting in Afghanistan against the Taliban; the U.S. and its coalition allies are battling significant insurgent forces in Iraq; Iran is threatening to go nuclear, and supporting the Hezbollah terrorists in the Middle East; and Russian troops and tanks recently rolled into Georgia. The next president of the United States and his administration clearly will have security as one of their top agenda items; and it will require a new way of thinking about the issue.

The security world has changed dramatically: geopolitically, industrially and technologically—including the range of potential threats, new missions, new forms of warfighting and intelligence gathering. In fact, in terms of change, many compare the current period to that following the launch of *Sputnik*, or the fall of the Berlin Wall and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union. Today, a holistic view of security is required; in order to cover worldwide terrorism, pandemics, weapons proliferation, insurgencies and “conventional” warfare in missions that include homeland security, global counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, threats from rogue nation states, regional conflicts, postwar stability and reconstruction and cyberwarfare (against our military as well as domestic and international infrastructures).

Perhaps most obvious is the change from the bipolar, relative stability of the Cold War to the extreme unpredictability of worldwide

security conditions today (requiring agility, rapid responsiveness and broad-based capability). In addition, it is clear that future security concerns will be multiagency and multinational. The former is already reflected in the fact that both the U.S. military’s Southern Command and newly formed African Command will have a State Department representative appointed as the deputy commander for civil-military affairs.

On the domestic side, it is clear that any future security issues to be addressed must combine the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Defense, the director of National Intelligence and other agencies such as Treasury, Commerce and Energy. Also, all of the security concerns of the 21st century, from the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction through terrorism and regional conflicts, can only be addressed on a multinational basis. A key aspect of 21st century security will be developing alliances with other nations (including working on development of partnerships with such countries as Russia, China and India; along with continuing our traditional partnerships with NATO countries).


The challenge for America, and for many other nations of the world, is how to address this broad range of 21st century security challenges within the limited resources available. In fact, for the past decade—and particularly since Sept. 11, 2001—the DoD has been living in a “rich man’s world,” with a rapidly expanding defense budget and \$100 billion-plus supplementals added each year. This level of defense funding has allowed the nation to defer many of

the difficult choices between buying more 20th century equipment for the more static, Cold War-threat environment, versus making a significant shift in resource allocations to address the more dynamic 21st century needs while still maintaining a conventional capability for regional conflicts, as well as a credible nuclear deterrent.

Recent speeches by Defense Secretary Robert Gates have highlighted the need to shift acquisition priorities to areas like fighting irregular forces in urban canyons; fighting cyberwarfare; a greater emphasis on language and culture understanding; greater resources devoted to unmanned systems; and far more attention to non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; etc. Correspondingly, he argues for fewer resources devoted to traditional ships, planes and tanks. Finally, on the industrial side, the last two decades have seen (as a recent Defense Science Board study has stated) “a consolidation of the defense industry around 20th century needs, rather than a transformation to a 21st century national security industrial structure.”

The problem, across the full security domain, is that the controlling policies, practices, laws and, particularly, the services’ budgets and “requirements” priorities have not been transformed sufficiently to match the needs of this new world. In fact, there is still much emphasis on “resetting” the forces to the pre-Operation Iraqi Freedom state, versus modernizing for likely 21st century security needs.

In essence, what is required is a significant “cultural change” on the part of the government’s national



security community, to adjust to this 21st century world; then the industrial base will correspondingly respond appropriately. Two things are unquestionably required. The first of these is the recognition of the continuing fiscal crisis. Driven by the state of the U.S. economy and the growing costs of Medicare, Social Security and energy sources, the debt structure and trade imbalance, there will be fewer discretionary dollars available for defense and, undoubtedly, far fewer (if any) for supplementals.

The second requirement for the cultural change is leadership with a vision and a strategy to move the security community in the needed 21st century direction. Gates has in recent months initiated this leadership effort and it is hoped that whoever is elected in November will continue it.

Two broad approaches are required to address this needed cultural change within the national security arena. Specifically, first, at the interagency (governmental) level, where an integrated national security strategy of the departments of State, Defense, Homeland Security, Intelligence and Treasury is required.

This integration must be led directly by the president, with a significant strengthening and restructuring at the national security adviser level. The second, and parallel, effort is within the Department of Defense itself—in the way it does its business. Here, perhaps the above-noted recent Defense Science Board Task Force finding and recommendations present the best summary. These were:

### Finding 1: Structure

DoD policies, processes and management of the Defense Acquisition Enterprise (broadly defined) impede the transition to an effective, agile, and affordable joint military force for the 21st century.

*Recommendation One:* Focus “requirements” and resources on joint, interoperable, net-centric systems-of-systems (with independent “architects” and enhanced government management and systems engineering capability).

*Recommendation Two:* “Train as we fight”: Recognize the political-military nature of future conflicts (and the role of the State Department), and recognize the role of contractors

on the battlefield. (In the current Iraq/Afghanistan conflicts, there are more than 190,000 contractors in theater.)

*Recommendation Three:* Achieve lower-cost and faster-to-field capabilities while still achieving better performance. (Make costs and schedules “requirements,” along with performance; and fully utilize “spiral development” to gain the benefits of lower risks, shorter schedules and significantly lower costs.)

### Finding 2: Equipment

U.S. government policies, practices and processes do not facilitate the development, deployment, and support of the innovative, affordable, and rapidly acquired weapons, systems and services needed for the 21st century forces.

*Recommendation Four:* Focus on “staying ahead” by adequately funding “engines of innovations,” including significant increases in research on “disruptive technologies.”

*see 21st century security, pg. 14*



**Jacques S. Gansler**, former undersecretary of defense for acquisition, technology and logistics, is a professor and holds the Roger C. Lipitz Chair in Public Policy and Private Enterprise in the School of Public Policy, and is the director of both the Center for Public Policy and Private Enterprise and the Sloan Biotechnology Industry Center. As the third-ranking civilian at the Pentagon from 1997 to 2001, Gansler was responsible for all research and development, acquisition reform, logistics, advance

technology, environmental security, defense industry and numerous other security programs. Before joining the Clinton administration, Gansler held a variety of senior positions in government and the private sector. He is also a member of the National Academy of Engineering and a Fellow of the National Academy of Public Administration. He served as interim dean of the School of Public Policy and also as the vice president for research at the university.

# Peacekeeping? Learn from the Experts

by *Daniel H. Levine*

**F**ive years into the war in Iraq, and seven years into the war in Afghanistan, two things have become clear about U.S. military policy. First, the United States has mastered conventional maneuver warfare, demonstrated by our swift victory in the “major combat operations” phase of the war in Iraq. Second, our military is unlikely to spend most of its time engaging in conventional maneuver warfare. The much-discussed (in some circles) Department of Defense Directive 3000.05 codified this second observation by making it DoD policy that “stability operations” are a core priority in DoD planning, comparable to traditional warfighting.

“Stability operations” is the DoD’s term for a spectrum of military operations including types of missions that are sometimes referred to as “peacekeeping,” “peace enforcement,” “counterinsurgency” and “military operations other than war.” What typically distinguishes these various types of operations is the level of force involved—“peacekeeping” involves lightly armed observation forces authorized to use force in self-defense, while “counterinsurgency” is a full-on military campaign against entrenched, irregular military groups. What stability operations have in common is a focus primarily on restoring order and security to the civilian population, rather than defeating an enemy. Of course, as military operations, defeating enemies is part of what goes on, but it is not the main point of the operation.

There is evidence that the U.S. military is getting better, tactically and strategically, at pursuing stability

operations than it was at the beginning of the war in Iraq. But given that stability operations are defined by not being about defeating an enemy, improving tactics and strategy can be only part of the solution. The DoD’s new Africa Command (AFRICOM) bills itself as a “different kind of command,” and definitely moves things in the right direction, by including staff from civilian agencies (such as the State Department and USAID), and highlighting its mandate to reach out to other nations and humanitarian organizations. While AFRICOM’s orientation is welcome, it still betrays a line of thinking that makes stability operations primarily military, with political and humanitarian support.

Military-focused thinking may cause us great difficulty in pursuing U.S. interests through stability operations in the future. United Nations peacekeeping missions are organized in a somewhat different context, and may hold lessons for how to move forward U.S. stability operations under the next administration.

The failures of U.N. peacekeeping are often more prominent than its successes. Almost everyone knows that the U.N. failed to prevent the Rwandan genocide, and the fall of the Srebrenica “safe zone” during the Balkan wars is similarly infamous. But in both cases, the U.N. forces were operating under the constraints of a limited mandate and limited resources. The U.N. force did not try and fail to stop the massacres in Rwanda; it was sent to Rwanda originally only to observe compliance with an earlier cease-fire, and was specifically denied authorization to use force except in self-defense even after

the genocide began. This is not to say that all U.N. peacekeeping failures can be explained as impossible mandates, but the U.N. has had a fairly solid track record when its peacekeepers are asked to undertake reasonable tasks relative to a mission’s resources and mandate—such as in El Salvador, Mozambique and Macedonia.

One maxim of U.N. peacekeeping is “no peacekeeping without a peace to keep.” The idea is that, unlike counterinsurgent forces, peacekeepers are not there to impose a solution to a conflict. The limited amounts of force available to peacekeepers mean that they can operate as observers in a dangerous environment, thereby providing assurances of compliance to suspicious parties, and they can contain, deter or eliminate relatively marginal “spoiler” groups that oppose the peace. While there have been “peace enforcement” missions under U.N. auspices, which can be more aggressive, even these have been aimed at limited goals, such as protecting humanitarian access (as with the initial U.S. involvement in Somalia) or defeating particular large spoiler groups in a limited area (as with the European Union’s Operation Artemis in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo). As a result of the limits on use of military force, most analysts and planners consider peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions less viable without a peace treaty in place, or at least a serious political process towards reconciliation—in such a situation, peacekeepers’ limited force can keep things on track and deter defection.

Statistical analysis of peacekeeping missions (carried out by Michael



W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis) bears out the reliance on political process to make peacekeeping viable. Conflicts in which a peace treaty was signed were more likely to result in peace and a modicum of good governance two years after the intervention (though peace treaties did not have an impact on peace defined merely as absence of violence, but without any democratic consolidation). The combination of a peacekeeping mission and a peace treaty had an even greater impact than either alone.

Might this be a second best—might U.N. peacekeeping need the presence of a peace agreement for success only because the U.N. can bring less force to bear than the United States? Our experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq should raise some skepticism about the value of superior firepower in stability operations. Not only has the U.S. encountered great difficulty containing insurgencies in both countries, much of the progress in Iraq is attributable to the alliances—political reconciliation—U.S. forces were able to make with tribes in western Iraq that had once fought us. The alliance with the

“Anbar awakening” tribes could not have succeeded had the U.S. been unable to provide military support that allowed our allies to drive out al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups. But the military force was in support of a political arrangement.

Again, this anecdotal evidence is borne out by the statistics. Doyle and Sambanis found that whether a conflict had ended in military victory for one side had no statistically significant impact on the presence or duration of peace. Defeating military forces is almost irrelevant when those forces have arisen from societal conflicts that are not yet resolved.

Though the U.N.’s peace-first stance may have arisen from the organization’s limitations, U.S. security policy can draw an important moral from it. The next administration, if it is serious about making the U.S. military effective in stability operations, needs to recognize that establishing peace and security requires putting military force in a broader political context. Force can be used to convince armed groups to remain within the process, but it cannot substitute for genuine resolution

of the conflicts that led to violence in the first place.

Practically speaking, this means that the AFRICOM model is on the right track, but does not go far enough. Stability operations cannot be seen as military endeavors in which diplomatic and humanitarian resources play a supporting role. Our first priority should be finding a way of reconciling parties to the conflict, not identifying enemies to defeat. This means expanding our diplomatic and humanitarian resources—giving them the resources to lead our security efforts in many parts of the world. The current administration has promised but never quite delivered on a general coordinator for reconstruction and stabilization in the State Department or on a civilian reserve corps. The next administration cannot view these as luxuries and think that increased military expenditure will make up for their lack. If we continue to think that building America’s might means only building America’s military, we are in real danger of losing the next decade’s important wars. **P**



**Daniel H. Levine** is an assistant professor in the School of Public Policy and an assistant research scholar in the Institute for Philosophy and Public Policy, specializing in moral and philosophical issues surrounding international law, civil conflict and peacekeeping operations. Levine also works with the education and training program of the U.S. Institute of Peace, where he has overseen work with the Iraqi higher education community and developed training courses in ethics and conflict

prevention. His most recent publication is *African Civilian Police Capacity for International Peacekeeping Operations*, released by the Henry L. Stimson Center’s Future of Peace Operations program in February 2008.

*Recommendation Five:* Understand and realize the benefits of globalization, which requires significant changes in export controls, “Buy American,” etc.

*Recommendation Six:* Achieve far greater use of “best value” competitions, and foster long-term competitive dynamics while rewarding industry for higher performance at lower costs.

*Recommendation Seven:* Transform the DoD logistics system to a modern, world-class, information-based, data-centric logistics system. Last year the DoD spent over \$150 billion on logistics, and did not do a world-class job, by any measure. The potential for enhanced material availability and response time is dramatic, while still achieving significant cost reductions.

### Finding 3: Personnel

The absence of many of the needed skills (e.g., systems engineering, biotechnology, advanced information technology, program and contract management, etc.) in DoD’s acquisition workforce, combined with the retirement and post-Cold War reductions of a large share of the overall acquisition workforce, significantly impedes the development, production, support and oversight of the military capabilities needed for the 21st century.

*Recommendation Eight:* Move aggressively to strengthen the future high-quality, high-skill government acquisition workforce (follow the recommendations of the Oct. 31, 2007, Commission Report on the DoD Acquisition Problems, chaired by Jacques Gansler and available at [www.army.mil/docs/Gansler\\_Commission\\_Report\\_Final\\_071031.pdf](http://www.army.mil/docs/Gansler_Commission_Report_Final_071031.pdf)).

### Finding 4: Industrial Base

Government acquisition policies and industry trends (e.g., further horizontal and vertical consolidations, following on the already very large consolidations of the last two decades, wherein more than 50 major firms have been consolidated into only a half dozen, and many of the smaller subsystem and even component firms have been absorbed within these “giants”) will not produce the required competitive, responsive, efficient and innovative national security industrial base.

*Recommendation Nine:* Articulate a national security industrial vision; adopt government policies to implement the vision; structure incentives for industry to achieve the vision; and monitor ongoing industrial dynamics (from mergers and acquisitions through program decisions) to ensure its realization.

*Recommendation Ten:* Remove the barriers to commercial and global technologies and products so the DoD can truly capitalize on the world trends in such technologies and products. Because the U.S. must maintain technological leadership—both for its economic competitiveness and its security—and because technology is now globalized and available to potential adversaries, the U.S. must not only have access to this commercial and global technology but it must stress its differentiation with an ability to integrate all of the best technologies into advanced systems-of-systems.

In summary, future military operations are likely to be political/military, expeditionary, “irregular,” coalition, multiagency and “joint” (multiservice). And, future defense budgets are likely to be smaller and without large supplementals. Thus, significant changes on both the military and the industrial side are required (and can be expected to be fiercely resisted). Therefore, strong leadership, on both the military and political sides is required to successfully achieve the needed changes. This must be a high and continuing priority for the new administration; or it will not happen. **P**

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Editor, *Public Policy*  
University of Maryland  
2101 Van Munching Hall  
College Park, MD 20742

Send information by fax  
to 301.403.4675 or by  
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2101 Van Munching Hall  
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